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Matching problems with preferences occur in widespread applications such as the as-
signment of school-leavers to universities, junior doctors to hospitals, students to campus
housing, children to schools, kidney transplant patients to donors and so on. The common
thread is that agents have preference lists over the possible outcomes and the task is to
find a matching of the participants that is in some sense optimal with respect to these
preferences.
The archetypal problem of this kind is the celebrated Stable Marriage problem, first
introduced by David Gale and Lloyd Shapley in 1962. Over the last decade there has
been something of a resurgence of interest in the algorithmic study of variants of this
problem. In addition, research has been instigated into related matching problems, for ex-
ample bipartite models with one-sided preferences, under criteria such as rank-maximality,
popularity and Pareto optimality. These developments can be attributed in part to the
growing tendency for matching processes to involve the online collection of preference in-
formation, necessitating efficient algorithms for constructing matchings that are fair and
optimal in an expanding range of problem variants.
The time is right, therefore, for a special issue of a leading journal to focus on matching
problems with preferences, with particular emphasis on the algorithms and complexity
perspective. We solicited papers studying matching problems including (but not limited
to) bipartite matching problems with preference lists on both sides (such as the Stable
Marriage or Hospitals / Residents problems), bipartite matching problems with one-sided
preferences (such as house allocation or paper assignment problems) and non-bipartite
matching problems involving preferences (such as the Stable Roommates problem), under
optimality criteria such as stability, rank-maximality, popularity and Pareto optimality.
This special issue includes selected papers from the workshop “Match-UP: Matching
Under Preferences - Algorithms and Complexity” that were invited for submission to this
issue of Algorithmica. The Match-UP workshop was held in Reykjav´ık on 6 July 2008 as a
satellite workshop of ICALP 2008 and was very well attended, attracting excellent invited
and contributed talks. The opening talk at the workshop was to have been given by one
of the key pioneers in the field, Professor David Gale, of the University of California,
Berkeley. Sadly, David Gale died suddenly on 7 March 2008, while preparations for the
workshop were under way. We are honoured to dedicate this special issue to his memory.
Six papers that are fully revised and extended versions of earlier submissions to the
Match-UP workshop were invited for submission to this special issue. In addition, the
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remaining six papers that appear here were submitted in response to a general call for
papers that was issued shortly after the workshop (and not restricted to authors who had
participated in the Match-UP workshop). All submissions were fully refereed to the usual
standards of Algorithmica. We were delighted with the response (in terms of both quality
and quantity) to both our paper invitations and the more general call for submissions,
and feel that that the twelve papers appearing in this special issue constitute an excellent
snapshot of the current state of the art regarding research in the field.
A brief summary of the twelve papers appearing in this special issue follows.
• In “Three-Sided Stable Matchings with Cyclic Preferences”, Pe´ter Biro´ and Eric Mc-
Dermid consider the three-sided extension of the Stable Marriage problem (featuring
men, women and dogs) in which preference lists are cyclic in nature, and show that
it is NP-complete to determine whether a stable matching exists, for two stability
criteria.
• Housing markets in which some agents’ houses are equivalent are considered by
Katar´ına Cechla´rova´ and Tama´s Fleiner in “Housing Markets Through Graphs”.
They show that, in this context, determining whether an economic equilibrium ex-
ists is polynomial-time solvable for strict preferences, but NP-complete for so-called
trichotomous preferences.
• Christine T. Cheng studies the complexity of finding generalized median stable
matchings in instances of the Stable Marriage problem in “Understanding the Gen-
eralized Median Stable Matchings”. She contributes polynomial-time algorithms,
NP-hardness, #P-hardness and approximability results for problems arising in this
context.
• In “An Efficient Algorithm for Batch Stability Testing”, John Dabney and Brian C.
Dean answer an open question of Gusfield and Irving [1] by demonstrating that a
set of matchings in an instance of the Stable Marriage problem with n men and n
women can be checked for stability in time sub-quadratic in n (following sufficient
pre-processing).
• Brian C. Dean and Siddharth Munshi study many-many variants of the Stable Mar-
riage and Stable Roommates problems in “Faster algorithms for Stable Allocation
Problems”. They give strongly polynomial-time algorithms for finding stable alloca-
tions in both the bipartite and non-bipartite settings, and also extend their results
to the problem of finding optimal stable allocations.
• Another variant of the Stable Roommates problem, this time where agents have
substitutable choice functions, is considered by Tama´s Fleiner in “The Stable Room-
mates Problem with Choice Functions”. He shows that the problem of finding a sta-
ble matching, or reporting that none exists, is polynomial-time solvable for so-called
increasing substitutable choice functions, though NP-hard for general substitutable
choice functions.
• Patrik Flore´en, Petteri Kaski, Valentin Polishchuk and Jukka Suomela consider dis-
tributed algorithms for finding matchings with few blocking pairs in instances of the
Stable Marriage problem in their paper “Almost Stable Matchings by Truncating
the Gale-Shapley Algorithm”.
• In “Assigning Papers to Referees”, Naveen Garg, Telikepalli Kavitha, Amit Kumar,
Kurt Mehlhorn and Julia´n Mestre study precisely this in the context of conference
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paper review assignment. They formulate a notion of a fair assignment, and give
polynomial-time algorithms, NP-hardness results and approximation algorithms for
problems involving computing such matchings.
• “Circular Stable Matching and 3-way Kidney Transplant” by Chien-Chung Huang
again studies the three-sided variant of the Stable Marriage problem and comple-
ments nicely the aforementioned paper of Pe´ter Biro´ and Eric McDermid. The author
also considers cyclic preferences but demonstrates NP-hardness results for different
cases of the problem, and, in adddition, contributes structural and #P-hardness
results.
• Hirotatsu Kobayashi and Tomomi Matsui study strategic issues in the Stable Mar-
riage problem in “Cheating Strategies for Gale-Shapley Algorithm with Complete
Preference Lists”. In particular, given a complete set of men’s preferences and a
partial matching M of men to women, the authors present algorithmic results for
the problem of finding a set of women’s preferences (if they exist) such that the
man-oriented Gale-Shapley algorithm returns a stable matching that contains M .
• The Stable Marriage problem is again considered by Da´niel Marx and Ildiko´ Schlot-
ter, this time where preference lists may be incomplete and may include ties, in
“Parameterized Complexity and Local Search Approaches for the Stable Marriage
Problem with Ties”. The authors present parameterized complexity results for the
problems of computing maximum size, egalitarian and minimum regret stable match-
ings in this context.
• In “A Polynomial-Time Algorithm to find von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Match-
ings in Marriage Games”, Jun Wako gives an O(n2) algorithm for finding a man-
optimal matching and a woman-optimal matching in a von Neumann-Morgenstern
stable set for a given instance of the Stable Marriage problem with n men and n
women.
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